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INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court decided the case of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,1 holding that the first and fourteenth amendments were violated by statutory bans on advertising prescription drug prices. In
so doing the Court apparently eliminated the commercial speech
exception to first amendment protection which had its origin thirtyfour years ago in Valentine v. Chrestensen.2 I say "apparently,"
because Virginia State Board left unclear its implications for most
of the issues to which the commercial speech doctrine had been
applied.
This article will deal primarily with those uncertain implications,
with emphasis on regulations at the local government level. However, it will begin with a brief history of the commercial speech
doctrine, followed by a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment
of that doctrine in Virginia State Board.
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

The first suggestion that commercial speech might not receive
full first amendment protection occurred in Schneider v. State.3
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
Williams College, 1965; LL.B., Yale University, 1968.
1. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Schneider struck down an ordinance which required prior police
approval of canvassing, set forth broad, discretionary grounds for
nonapproval, and placed certain stringent time and manner restrictions on the canvassing itself. Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, stated in dictum that "[w]e are not to be taken as
holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be sub'4
jected to such regulation as the ordinance requires.
If the commercial speech doctrine was foretold in Schneider, it
was born in Valentine v. Chrestensen. There the Supreme Court
upheld a New York City municipal ordinance which prohibited distribution on the streets of "commercial and business advertising
matter." Chrestensen was convicted for distributing handbills
advertising the commercial exhibition of a submarine. Justice
Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that although the
streets could not be entirely closed to general communication of
information, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." 5
Nine years later, in Breard v. Alexandria,6 the scope of the
Valentine commercial speech exception was tested. In Breard the
Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting door-todoor solicitation for the sale of "goods, wares and merchandise"
without advance permission of the householder. The ordinance was
being applied to a person soliciting subscriptions to certain national
magazines.
The significance of Breard lay in the fact that a year after Valentine, in Martin v. City of Struthers,7 the Court had held unconstitutional an ordinance banning all door-to-door handbilling. In that
case the ordinance had been applied to the distribution of literature
advertising a religious meeting. The same day, in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,8 drawing upon two earlier decisions,) the Court had
struck down an ordinance imposing a flat license fee on canvassing
and soliciting which was being applied to the door-to-door sale of
religious materials. In Martin and Murdock the Court had found
Valentine inapplicable. However, in Breard the Court upheld the
ordinance, despite acknowledging the first amendment protection
afforded the periodicals themselves. It distinguished Breard from
Martin and Murdock on the ground that door-to-door sale introduced a commercial element not present in those cases.
4. Id. at 165.
5. 316 U.S. at 54.
6. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
7. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
8. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
9. Janison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S.296 (1940).
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Breard is susceptible to at least two interpretations. The first
is that the commercialization of fully protected speech renders it
either less protected or even unprotected. The second is that although it does not render otherwise fully protected speech less
protected or unprotected, commercialization does make regulating
protected speech permissible in order to prevent fraud, deception,
duress, invasion of privacy, and other evils unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Under the first interpretation, Breard differs
from Martin in that the latter involved fully protected-that is,
noncommercial-speech. Under the second interpretation, the sale
of magazines is as worthy of first amendment protection as is the
free dissemination of religious tracts. However, door-to-door
selling introduces the possibility of psychological coercion, whereas
free dissemination does not.
The first interpretation does not adequately distinguish the sale
of religious literature that occurred in Murdock. Nevertheless, the
first does seem more plausible. The Breard Court stressed privacy,
not coercion. And in Valentine the evils the ordinance attacked
did not vary according to whether the handbills were commercial
or noncommercial. But in several subsequent cases, 10 the Supreme
Court made clear that this interpretation of Breard was erroneous.
The fact that otherwise fully protected speech was bought and sold
in the marketplace would not strip it of its protection. Indeed,
prior to its decision in Breard, the Court had stated, in the context
of regulating labor organizers, that a financial motive did not itself
reduce first amendment protection." Therefore, the second inter10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), involving a
defamation suit brought against a newspaper for the publication of a paid
advertisement of a political nature; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959),
involving the conviction of a bookseller under an obscenity statute; and
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), involving allegedly obscene motion pictures.
11. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).

Professor C. Edwin Baker has offered a theory of the first amendment
which would justify excluding some forms of commercial speech from protection, relegating them to the general protection of property rights found
in the due process and contracts clauses. Briefly, Baker sees the first
amendment as protecting the freedom of the speaker to express and communicate (with willing listeners) that which he deems important, and not
as protecting a marketplace of ideas. Speech by enterprises whose directors are legally bound to pursue profits or by enterprises which treat the
speech as an expense and not as a consumption of income does not reflect
the values of any person or group but is solely a product of the mandate to
return a profit. As such it does not come within the rationale for first
amendment protection.

pretation, strained though it is, had to be correct if Breard was
still good law: Selling may be regulated more stringently than may
free distribution in order to protect against certain evils. This
principle is true despite the fact that the article being sold is protected by the first amendment.
So far the discussion has focused on the commercial speech
doctrine in the context in which it arose-that is, advertising and
soliciting restrictions which concerned the location and manner,
but not the content, of the message. With respect to regulating
time, place, and manner, the commercial speech doctrine gave less
12
protection to advertising and solicitation than to other speech.
Advertising and solicitation have also been subjected to content
regulation and, in certain areas, to complete bans. Regulation has
been aimed at preventing false, deceptive, or product-disparaging
claims. The complete bans on advertising and soliciting have been
premised upon either the undesirability or the illegality of the
product or upon the undesirability of advertising an otherwise
acceptable product.
Baker would thus distinguish commercial speech by its source and moti-

vation, not by its content. However, he does not believe that the cases
mentioned in note 10 supra were necessarily wrongly decided. He would
make exception for the profit-motivated industries whose product is speech
-the press, the broadcast media, the movies-on three grounds: (1) These
industries need not be concerned with stimulating desires for any particular
product other than communicated expression itself; (2) these industries
have been singled out by the Constitution to be free from governmental
control in order to protect effective criticism of the government; (3) and
within these industries it is impossible to tell whether the speech of those
involved in the industry is for the purpose of producing profits or whether
the profits are produced in order to promote their speech. Thus under
Baker's theory, the first amendment would not protect any speech (political
or purely commercial) by an enterprise (other than one whose product is
speech) which is legally obligated to pursue profit or which treats the
speech as a business expense, except perhaps speech which is purely informative or which is made at the request of customers.
Parts of Baker's theory will be rejected by many people-especially a distinction which he draws between speech which expresses instrumental
values (unprotected) and speech which expresses substantive values
(protected), for this distinction is broader and more dubious than the distinction between speech regarded as a business expense and speech regarded
as consumption of income. Nevertheless, the theory warrants close attention, as does the question of what due process protection should be accorded
sellers, or perhaps more importantly buyers, with respect to commercial
messages excluded from first amendment protection by the theory. Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv.
1 (1976).
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1942), which did involve content control, were mentioned only to
demonstrate that the most far-reaching interpretation of the doctrine was
never accepted by the Court.
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Little needs to be said at this juncture about the bans on false
and deceptive advertising or product disparagement. The scholarly
criticism in this area has focused primarily on the distinction the
courts have drawn between claims by sellers and similar claims by
third parties, who were not subject to the sanctions applied to the
former, and upon the general question of whether false and deceptive or defamatory claims in other areas-for instance, the
political-should be treated differently from false, deceptive, or
disparaging advertising of products.' 3 For example, some commen4
tators have suggested that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'

rule should apply to product disparagement. 5
The bans on truthful advertising premised on the undesirability
or illegality of the product, or the undesirability per se of advertising the particular product, do deserve some comment because
they are the forebears of Virginia State Board. Illustrative of
advertising bans predicated on the undesirability of a legal product
are the bans on racially informative statements designed to prevent
discrimination or blockbusting 6 and the ban on cigarette advertising on television.' 7 In such cases the government has chosen to
discourage an activity by preventing its advertisement, rather than
by attempting to outlaw it directly. The latter alternative might
raise constitutional questions.
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human

Relations,'8 decided in 1973, the Supreme Court invoked the Valentine commercial speech doctrine to uphold suppressing advertisement of sexually discriminatory employment offers. The case
was significant, not only because of the Court's stated willingness
to continue to apply the commercial speech doctrine and to apply
it to offers of employment, but also because the Court stressed the
illegality of the underlying transaction being advertised. How the
13. See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 429 (1971).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

15. Redish, supra note 13, at 458-64. But see Baker, supra note 11, at
42-43 n.146.
16. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786
(3d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 351 (1976); United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
17. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
18. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

illegality of sexual discrimination entered the Pittsburgh Press
analysis is not at all clear. Typically, in the first amendment area,
advocating a criminal act is protected until there exists imminent
danger of a crime occurring; at that point advocacy is denominated
inciting or aiding.19 Soliciting a criminal act is treated differently.
There need be no imminent danger in fact, for in many. cases the
person solicited is an undercover police officer. Conceptually,
exactly which factors distinguish solicitation from advocacy are, I
submit, extremely unclear. The most that can be said is that the
distinction appears to turn on the nature of the incentive offered
and perhaps also on the relationship between the solicitor and the
person solicited. In any event, the Pittsburgh Press Court may
have believed that the advertisement in question amounted to
soliciting a crime and thus was clearly suppressible irrespective of
the commercial speech doctrine. However, if the Court did not
believe that the advertisement equaled solicitation of a crime,
the illegality of the advertised transaction itself would not be a
sufficient explanation, apart from the commercial speech doctrine,
of why the Court allowed the prohibition to stand.
In 1975, the demise of the commercial speech doctrine, if that is
what Virginia State Board has wrought, was portended in Bigelow
v. Virginia.20 The Court had before it a Virginia statute forbidding
advertising abortion services. The statute was being applied to a
Virginia newspaper editor who had run a paid advertisement
for a New York abortion referral service. One justification for the
statute proffered by the dissent was protecting Virginia citizens
from psychological pressures to choose abortion. In other words,
although abortion could not be prohibited (and could not perhaps
be deemed an undesirable activity similar to smoking in the sense
that it could be deterred constitutionally through an advertising
ban), it is an activity which should not be subject to any coercion
that advertising might produce. Nonetheless, the Court in Bigelow
began to retreat from Valentine and the commercial speech doctrine
by rejecting first the contention that commercial advertising is per
se unprotected. Valentine's continued validity was deemed questionable beyond its narrow factual context, which the Court described as involving "a reasonable regulation of the manner in
which commercial advertising could be distributed." 21 The Court
failed to state precisely how the Valentine regulation, a blanket ban
on commercial handbilling, was reasonable, while a blanket ban on
all other handbilling was not. Surely commercial handbilling is not
19. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
21. Id. at 819.
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any more coercive than other handbilling, especially if no sale is to
be consummated at the time the handbill is distributed.
After this all-but-express overruling of Valentine, the Bigelow
Court pointed out that the commercial advertisement before it
referred to a matter of clear public interest and related to an
activity partially protected from state interference. 22 This combination of public interest and constitutional immunity of the advertised activity rendered the advertisement protectible under the first
amendment.2 3 However, the Court did not attempt to define the
parameters of the public interest test, a test which has been notoriously difficult to apply in the defamation/privacy area.24 And
with respect to the protected status of abortion, the Court
observed: "We need not decide in this case the precise extent to
which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that
is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even
25
prohibit."
All that was clear after Bigelow was that nothing was clear. What
was the status of cases like Valentine and Breard and of commercial
handbilling and door-to-door canvassing generally? What rendered
an advertisement a matter of public interest? And what role was
played by the legality and regulability of the activity advertised?
Because some aspects of abortions may be regulated under Roe v.
Wade,26 why may abortions not be regulated with respect to advertising? Did the Court peek at the legislative motive27 in Bigelow
and determine that the state's real purpose was not to prevent
psychological coercion, but rather to deter the activity through
suppression of information about it? Finally, was the compelling
state interest test to be applied to advertising like that in Bigelow,
as it would to other forms of protected speech, or was some lesser
balancing test to be applied? Without explanation, the Court
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

23. Baker disagrees that the advertisement in Bigelow was protected
speech. But he thinks the decision was correct because of the burden that
would be placed on the press were it required to assess the legality of
advertisements under his first amendment test. Baker, supra note 11, at
49-50.

24. See Gertz v.Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-46 (1974).
25. 421 U.S. at 825.

26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. The orthodox position has been that actual legislative motive is irrelevant to the constitutionality of legislation. Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86
(1968). But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.,
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v.Davis,426 U.S. 229 (1976).

appeared to take the latter course, although it severely discounted
the importance of valid state interests. Did advertising remain a
lesser type of speech?
THE Virginia State Board OPINION
It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided
Virginia State Board. Justice Blackmun, writing the majority
opinion in which Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Powell
joined, began by describing briefly the practice of pharmacy in
Virginia. He then discussed the right to receive the communications that the plaintiffs, consumer groups, were asserting. He
concluded that if the pharmacists' right to advertise existed,
consumers would have a right to receive the advertising and that
these plaintiffs could assert such a right.
Blackmun then directed his attention to the right to advertise
drug prices. He dealt first with Valentine and Breard, noting that
since Breard,the Court had never denied protection to speech solely
on the ground that the speech was commercial. Pittsburgh Press
was explained as turning on the illegality of the conduct advertised.
Bigelow was discussed and accurately described as a retreat from
Valentine, but not a direct overruling because of the public interest
in abortion and abortion's constitutional immunity from suppression. Blackmun then concluded the discussion of Bigelow:
[In Virginia State Board], in contrast [to Bigelow], the question whether there is a First Amendment exception for "commercial speech" is squarely before us. Our pharmacist does not
wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or
political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy
fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial
matters. The "idea" he wishes to communicate is simply this:
"I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." Our
question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside
the protection of the First Amendment. 28

Blackmun began the Court's answer to the question of whether
the first amendment excepts commercial speech by stating several
established propositions. First, speech is not unprotected solely
because money is spent to project it, because it is in a form that
is sold, or because it involves a solicitation to purchase or otherwise
pay or contribute money. Second, commercial speech may not be
deemed unprotected because it is uneditorial, for purely factual
matter of public interest is protected.
Justice Blackmun then reformulated the question of protecting
commercial speech to be
whether speech which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction," . . . is so removed from all "exposition of ideas,"
...and from "'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in
28. 425 U.S. at 760-61.
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its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,' " . .. that it lacks all protectios.

Our answer is that it is

not.29

First, even if true, it is irrelevant that the advertiser has a purely
economic interest. Blackmun cited as support for this proposition
the first amendment protection afforded contestants in labor
30
But
disputes who are motivated by purely economic concerns.
speech
on
restrictions
certain
that
fact
the
a
footnote
he relegated to
in the labor disputes context had been upheld, a point which dissenting Justice Rehnquist found significant. Blackmun said that
the Court was expressing no view on the constitutionality of these
restrictions, referring to the entire matter of speech in labor disputes as a "complex subject."
Second, commercial speech cannot be distinguished from other,
fully protected speech because of the absence of public interest in
the information conveyed. Blackmun described at length the
public interest in commercial advertisements and concluded:
Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or even
a very great public interest element. There are few to which
such an element, however, could not be added. Our pharmacist,
for example, could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store
disparities in drug prices, giving his own and those of a competiin requiring him to do so, and
tor as proof. We see little point
3
little difference if he does not. 1
Finally, Blackmun pointed to a capitalistic society's public interest in intelligent, well-informed, private decisions in the marketplace. These decisions require the free flow of commercial information. And, said Blackmun, if the free flow of commercial
information is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources
in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation
of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated
'3 2
or altered.
After detailing the reasons for revitalizing first amendment protection of commercial speech, Blackmun turned his attention to the
interests asserted by Virginia in banning prescription drug advertising. What is remarkable is that he did so as part of the argument
that commercial speech should be welcomed back into the fold of
fully protected speech, and not as part of determining whether an
imminent danger to some compelling state interest existed which
29.
30.
latter
31.
32.

Id. at 762.
Baker distinguishes economic motives from profit motive. Only the
abrogates first amendment protection. Baker, supra note 11.
425 U.S. at 764-65.
Id. at 765.

would support regulating ordinary protected speech. Advertising
would increase competition, and competition, said Virginia, would
endanger the quality of service rendered by pharmacists, perhaps
raise drug prices (because of advertising costs), encourage price
shopping (upsetting the stability of the pharmacist-customer
relationship), and lower the pharmacist's professional image.
Blackmun characterized these arguments for Virginia's ban as
resting "in large measure on the advantages of the citizens' . . .
being kept in ignorance." The advertising ban affected professional
standards only through the assumed customer response to the free
flow of drug price information. Blackmun concluded:
Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them
from competition in other ways ....
But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering. In this sense, the justifications
Virginia has offered for suppressing the flow of prescription drug
price information, far from persuading us that the flow is not
protected by the First Amendment, have re-enforced our view
that it is. We so hold.33

After holding commercial speech, specifically the speech at issue
in the case, protectible under the first amendment, Blackmun concluded the Court's opinion by retreating somewhat from a position
of full first amendment protection for commercial speech. After
stating that commercial speech, like other speech, could be
subjected to content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations-

an already accepted proposition-Blackmun named three areas in
which commercial speech might be regulated more stringently than

is other protected speech.3 4 The first is the area of false and
deceptive advertising, where Blackmun discounted the chilling
effect of failing to allow a New York Times Co. v. Sullivan defense
or of requiring that additional information, disclaimers, or warnings
be attached to certain advertisements or solicitations. The second
is the area of advertising illegal transactions or events. The third
is the area of commercials on radio or television. However,
Blackmun did not elaborate on the scope of or rationale behind this
differential treatment of commercial speech.
Chief Justice Burger concurred separately in order to emphasize
his understanding that the Court had not touched the area of advertising professional services, such as those rendered by attorneys and
physicians. In fact, the last footnote in Blackmun's opinion had
33. Id. at 770. Baker finds the decision in Virginia State Board justifiable only on the assumption that the pharmacists were forbidden from publicizing their prices upon request from consumers (Baker, supra note 11, at
52-53), an assumption which Justice Rehnquist thought was untrue. See
note 39 infra.
34. See Baker, supra note 11, at 41 n.143 &45-46.
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said as much, noting that advertising "professional services" of an
almost infinite variety and nature created a much greater possibility for confusion or deception than existed with advertising drug
35
prices.
Justice Stewart concurred separately in order to explain why he
did not believe the Court's holding affected the laws regulating
false and deceptive advertising. Although he restated the reasons
given by Justice Blackmun on behalf of the majority, he went
further in distinguishing advertising from other protected speech
whenever the issue is regulating false and deceptive practices.
He pointed out that speech in labor disputes, though otherwise
enjoying full first amendment protection, may be regulated in
ways in which political speech may not. For example, citing
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,3s he pointed out that an employer's freedom to communicate his views to his employees may
be restricted by the requirement that any predictions about the
effect of unionization on the company "be carefully phrased on the
basis of objective fact. 37 And in a footnote, with citation to authority, he stated:
Speech by an employer or a labor union organizer that contains
material misrepresentations of fact or appeals to racial prejudice
may form the basis of an unfair labor practice or warrant the invalidation of a certification election .... Such restrictions would
clearly violate First Amendment guarantees if applied to political
expression concerning the election of candidates to public office.
... Other restrictions designed to promote antiseptic conditions
in the labor relations context, such as the prohibition of certain
campaigning during the 24-hour period preceding the election,
would be constitutionally intolerable if applied in the political
arena .... 38
He concluded his opinion with the following passage:
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from
ideological expression because it is confined to the promotion of
specific goods or services. The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of the "information of potential interest and
value" conveyed, . . .rather than because of any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas.... Since the factual claims contained in commercial price or product advertisements relate to
tangible goods or services, they may be tested empirically and
corrected to reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing
the free dissemination of thought. Indeed, the elimination of
false and deceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and
35.
36.
37.
38.

425
395
425
Id.

U.S. at 773 n.25.
U.S. 575 (1969).
U.S. at 778.
at 778 n.3.

reliable 3 9information relevant to public and private decisionmaking.
IMPLICATIONS OF Virginia State Board
The discussion now turns to the possible implications of Virginia
State Board for various types of regulations of commercial speech.
Some of these types may have been totally preempted by federal
or even state law, but most will be regulations which local communities have some power to utilize.
The first area of importance is that of time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech, including zoning ordinances and similar
measures. In the light of Virginia State Board, what is the constitutional status of general ordinances zoning commercial activity,
including commerce in books, movies, and art as well as in nonspeech-related goods? In other words, may bookstores and movie
theaters be zoned as businesses along with hardware stores and
restaurants? Note that such a zoning ordinance may give to books
handed out door-to-door or to speeches preference over books and
movies sold at fixed locations. In this sense the ordinance resembles that in Breard, which gave preference to some forms of
door-to-door distribution (those protected under Martin v. City of
Struthers and Murdock v. Pennsylvania) over others (the doorto-door sale of products, including speech products). Although
Breard was used by the Virginia State Board Court as an important
example of the commercial speech doctrine in action, absolutely
nothing in the latter case suggests that a general ordinance aimed
at business establishments must except those businesses which deal
in some form of speech so long as problems exist which are unique
in type and magnitude to business establishments and are not
present in door-to-door canvassing or general speech-making.
Indeed, another case decided last term, Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc.,40 in upholding special zoning of adult bookstores,
39. Id. at 780-81. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in Virginia
State Board. Although he questioned the Court's finding that plaintiffs
had standing, his main polemical guns were trained on the overruling of
the commercial speech doctrine. He professed inability to understand
how the Court could distinguish advertising of drug prices from advertising
of professional services, or why an employer may be prohibited from publicizing, in a labor dispute, the truthful promise of a benefit, whereas
pharmacists may not be prohibited from publicizing truthful prices. He
pointed out the difficulties of defining misleading or deceptive advertising.
And he concluded by noting that suppression of information about harmful
but legal products, such as cigarettes, had previously been upheld (and
should continue to be so) and that the information sought in the instant
case could be obtained legally through channels other than advertising.
Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
40. 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976).
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implicitly approves zoning of speech-related commercial establishments.
Suppose that certain speech-related commercial enterprises are
zoned differently, perhaps more restrictively, than are other speechrelated and non-speech-related commercial enterprises. The classification might turn on the form in which the speech is packagedmovie theaters versus bookstores, or bookstores versus newsracksor upon the content of the speech-adult movies versus other
movies. Or, to move from trade to advertising, suppose that a city
wishes to subject sound trucks or billboards bearing political
messages to lesser (or greater) restrictions than applied to sound
trucks or billboards bearing commercial messages. Or suppose that
it wishes to distinguish in the sound truck/billboard context within
the broad class of commercial messages. Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc. is directly on point. Its precursor is Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights,41 which, contrary to the California Supreme
Court's decision in Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
Distyict,4 2 upheld a content-based differential treatment of advertising which resulted in the commercial being treated more favorably than the political. 43 Both of these cases stand in an uneasy
relationship to two other cases in which content-based differential
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech were struck down:
Police Department v. Mosley 44 and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,4 5 the former dealing with picketing, the latter, with drive-in
46
movies.
The uncertainty which pervades this area will undoubtedly
41. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
42. 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
43. In Lehman, the Court sustained a city's sale of commercial and
public service, but not political or public issue, advertising space on its
vehicles. In Wirta, the California Supreme Court struck down a transit
district's restriction of ads on its vehicles to commercial solicitations and
ballot issues and candidates. Baker suggests that Lehman rejects the
proposition that commercial advertisements are first amendment speech
and thereby avoids the result of favoring one type of first amendment
speech over another. Baker, supra note 11, at 41 n.144.
44. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
45. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
46. In Mosley, the Court invalidated, on both equal protection and first
amendment grounds, an ordinance banning all picketing, except labor
picketing, within 150 feet of a school in session. In Erznoznik, the Court
invalidated an ordinance which prohibited drive-in theaters from showing
movies containing nudity when the screens were visible from a public
place. The ordinance was held to be either under- or over-inclusive with
respect to each of the purposes which it was said to further.

continue. However, I would say that a distinction based on the
form of packaging-bookstores versus movie theaters-will probably be upheld upon the showing of some substantial state interest
behind the distinction, such as the interest in preventing the decay
of neighborhoods which sufficed in Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc.
Content distinctions, both within the area of commercial speech
and between commercial and non-commercial speech, are more
problematic. In the area of advertising media, regulations of
billboards, sound trucks, or other similar media which favor political speech over commercial speech, or favor some commercial
speech over other commercial speech, probably will fall after
Virginia State Board. It is very doubtful that the Court will allow,
for example, political billboards preference over a billboard leased
by Ralph Nader to attack the quality of Detroit's latest autos. And
if Nader's billboard must be allowed, so must General Motors', for
47
profit motive is irrelevant.
In the area of trade, some door-to-door canvassing restrictions on
commercial activity, such as those in Breard, may be upheld, not
because the commercial is second-class, but rather because the state
interest regarding coercion and privacy 48 may vary along the commercial/noncommercial lines drawn by the restrictions in question.
And general zoning of commercial activity, as I have already said,
will undoubtedly be upheld, so long as noncommercial speech
activities which create problems of the same type and magnitude
as do bookstores and movie theaters are treated similarly. Differential zoning of commercial establishments dealing in speech, if
based on content, will stand or fall depending upon whether the
court sees the case as more similar to Mini-Theatres or to Erznoznik
49
and Mosley.
47. But see Baker, supranote 11.
48. The initial invasion of privacy is constant regardless of whether the
canvasser is selling items or giving them away. However, on the one
hand, the commercially oriented canvasser may be much more likely to
intrude further than one who is merely distributing materials. On the
other hand, the noncommercial canvasser who is soliciting funds for political
or charitable causes may be as intrusive as the commercial.
49. The Court in Mini-Theatres distinguished Erznoznik in a footnote:
The City Council's determination was that a concentration of
"adult" movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a
focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters
showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect which this
zoning ordinance attempts to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" speech. In contrast, in Erznozni1, . . . the justifications
offered by the city rested primarily on the city's interest in protecting its citizens from exposure to unwanted, "offensive"
speech. The only secondary effect relied on to support that ordinance was the impact on traffic-an effect which might be caused
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To return to advertising, as opposed to trade, if differential
by a distracting open-air movie even if it did not exhibit nudity.
96 S. Ct. at 2452 n.34. However, the Court made no attempt whatsoever to
distinguish Mosley. (Justice Powell, concurring, merely asserted that in
Mosley no governmental interest justified the content-based distinction.
Id. at 2458 n.6.)
There may be at least two methods of reconciling Mini-Theatres with
Mosley. The first is merely to deny that the content of speech must be
either protected or unprotected under the first amendment-in other words,
that there are no degrees of first amendment protection of speech content.
This method finds ample support both in the plurality opinion's discussion
of how content affects protectibility in the context of fighting words, libel,
commercial speech, labor speech, and speech directed to juveniles and in
its distinction between political and philosophical speech on the one hand
and the "less important" speech represented by adult movies on the other.
Moreover, Virginia State Board gives less first amendment protection to
commercial speech, at least advertising, than to other forms of speech. See
text accompanying note 34 supra.
The second method does not depend upon ranking various kinds of
speech content in terms of first amendment protectibility. Rather, it
involves examining the meaning of Mosley's content-neutrality requirement. Assume that an ordinance forbids any parade or demonstration
which substantially obstructs traffic-a paradigmatic content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction on speech. And assume further that parades
by Democrats always obstruct traffic and that parades by Republicans and
other groups never do. Why this happens is not particularly important,
except that it is the result neither of people believing what the Democrats
are saying [see Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204 (1972)] nor of unreasonable crowd reaction to the Democratic message. [See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Cf.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), upholding restrictions
on "fighting words." But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).]
Given these assumptions, no difference will result between enforcing the
content-neutral ordinance and enforcing an ordinance which forbids only
Democratic parades and demonstrations. Nor would there have been any
difference in result in Mosley between enforcement of the ordinance at
issue and enforcement of one banning all disruptive picketing near schools
had the picketing excepted in Mosley-labor picketing-always been less
disruptive than all other picketing. Similarly, had wilful destruction of
draft cards always been associated with a particular message-opposition
to the Viet Nam war-a content-biased statute ("do not wilfully destroy
draft cards in order to protest the Viet Nam war") would have effected
the same results as the content-neutral statute at issue in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Of course, it is difficult to imagine any causal connection between the
content of speech and the harms described other than one based on the
audience's believing the message or one based on the audience's reacting
with unreasonable hostility to it. Nevertheless, such a causal connection
might exist at a certain time between adult movies and neighborhood
blight. And if it were to, an ordinance specially zoning adult theaters
would effect a result identical to a content-neutral ordinance specially
zoning "causes of neighborhood blight."
What the above discussion shows is that the concept of content neutrality
is not all that clear. Indeed, when the Supreme Court decided, in Hudgens

treatment of the commercial and noncommercial-for example, in
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), that Mosley required the denial of a first
amendment exception for labor picketing in enforcing private shopping
centers' exclusion of speech activities-a position which had been urged by
those who believe content neutrality is at the heart of the first amendment
[e.g., Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cr. L. REv. 20, 41 (1975) ]--Justice Marshall, who had written the Court's
opinion in Mosley, dissented on the ground that the result of the majority's
holding would not be content-neutral but would instead penalize those
messages whose effectiveness depends upon access to the shopping center.
424 U.S. at 525-43 (dissenting opinion). Marshall's concept of content-neutrality-taking equal account of each message's need for using certain media
-echoes Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968). This concept also finds some support in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969). It is completely
antithetical to the concept of content-neutrality ("rich messages and poor
messages are equally disabled from sleeping under the bridge of a particular
medium") found in the majority opinions in Hudgens and Mosley and urged
by such commentators as Professor Kenneth Karst, supra. Cf. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1976) (striking down expenditure limitations
designed to equalize the positions of wealthy and poor candidates); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a
Florida right-of-reply statute guaranteeing political candidates access to
privately owned newspapers which have attacked their candidacy); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(refusing under the first amendment to compel access to the broadcast
media of paid public-issue advertisements).
The general view is that the first amendment mandates minimum, and
not merely equal, access to certain publicly-owned and perhaps privatelyowned property for purposes of communication, even at the expense of
interests such as protection of the fisc, of aesthetics, of privacy and of
sensibilities. See, e.g., Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action
and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 893, 905-6 n.37 (1976);
Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE L.J.
931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Stone,
Fora Americana, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum
Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117
(1975). This view stems from a recognition that either rule-minimum
access or equal access-although facially content-neutral, de facto favors
and disfavors different speakers and messages. See also the debate in the
context of the first amendment religion clauses over whether the required
governmental neutrality vis-a-vis religion is blindness to the religious
interests affected by government action [P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW 112 (1962)] or is instead neutrality regarding what counts as a
religious interest but not indifference to effect on religion [Hollingsworth,
Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?,
34 OHIO ST. L.J. 15 (1973)].
Even if one accepts the Mosley concept of content-neutrality and rejects
the Marshall concept, how should a court deal with a law which places a
time, place, or manner restriction on a particular message because that
message is closely associated with a particular harm which could have been
defined in a content-neutral manner? There are these possibilities:
(1) The court could find that the law is over- and/or under-inclusive
with respect to the harm and strike it down on that ground.
(2) The court could find that the causal connection between the law
and elimination of the harm rests upon people believing in and acting upon
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the context of billboards, sound trucks, or perhaps door-to-door
the message or upon people reacting to the message in an unreasonably
hostile manner. The court would then protect the message and force the
state to attempt to eliminate the harm by focusing on the acts of those in
the audience immediately causing the harm.
(3) The court could find that although a causal link existed between

the harm and the use of the medium by the particular message, there were
harms of equal severity which were caused by other messages utilizing
that medium. The court would then force the state to define the harm at
higher level of generality, at which point the law in question would be
fatally under-inclusive. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrUTI ONAL DECISIONMAKING 565-66 (1975).
(Note that Marshall's concept of content-neu-

trality can be viewed as an attempt to redefine the harm to which the law
in question is directed for example, from "to prevent disruption" to "to
prevent disruption without seriously impeding communication of messages.")
(4) The Court could find that the legislative motive was to suppress the
message itself rather than to suppress the message's peculiar time, place,
and manner effects. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
(5) If the court does not find defects (1) through (4), it must, in order
to invalidate the law, find that the causal relation is such that for a legislature, as opposed to an adjudicatory body, to take cognizance of the causal
relation would be inappropriate. This final approach to invalidation resembles approaches the Supreme Court has taken in the Bills of Attainder
cases [e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) ] and in those cases
involving legislative grants of monopolies or other special privileges to
particular people or enterprises [e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957),
overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976)]. See also Alexander, supra 916-18 n.66 (1976).
(Cf. the related problem of a statute
which by its terms suppresses content but is applied in a situation in
which a suppressible mischief does exist. See, e.g., Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969) (conviction under a flag desecration statute for 13urning
a flag on a street corner). The problem in such a case is the statute, not
the suppression of the mischief. The statute does not by its terms indicate
a legislative concern with the mischief, nor will a similar mischief necessarily exist in any future application of the statute. Because the factors
specified by the statute's terms add nothing relevant to the mischief, the
mischief is not the "hard core" of a merely overbroad statute.)
Difficulties with the concept of content-neutrality in the first amendment
area are related to a larger difficulty with what Professor Paul Brest terms
the "equal protection mode" of constitutional rights. P. BREST, supra, 274-76
(1975). When a classification for entitlement to a benefit which is not
constitutionally mandated turns on the exercise of a constitutional right,
the unequal provision of the benefit may deter such exercise, or it may not.
If it does, unless the state interest in the classification is compelling, that
right itself is infringed. If it does not, a pure equal protection analysis
should be applied to determine whether the classification is an acceptable
proxy for a legitimate grounds for entitlement. Compare, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (probably no deterrence), with Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (probably some deterrence).

advertising-is allowed, much will depend on characterizing something as commercial. If Consumers Union rents a sound truck
or billboard space to proclaim its findings about various commercial products, is this activity "commercial speech"? No court or
city council should approach such a definitional question without
looking at the substantive evils that are sought to be prevented.
Profit motive, all that distinguishes an advertisement placed by a
seller and the same advertisement placed by a third party, is not
relevant to constitutional protection except in the few situations in
which profit motive might affect coerciveness or the potential for
fraud and deception. As the Virginia State Board Court took pains
to reaffirm, profit motive surely does not affect the intrinsic value
of the speech.5 0
How has Virginia State Board affected the validity of commercial
licenses for those whose stock-in-trade is speech-namely, booksellers, movie theaters, magazine salesmen, and the like? Murdock
v. Pennsylvania stands for the proposition that license fees unrelated to actual costs incurred by the locality must fall when
imposed on door-to-door sellers of religious tracts. Has Virginia
State Board extended Murdock to businesses? The logic of the
opinion suggests that it has, unless, of course, Murdock is no longer
good law. But because so many businesses deal to some extent in
speech products, and because it is so very difficult to determine
when a license fee exceeds the costs imposed on the locality, my
instinct tells me that the Court will struggle mightily to uphold
such fees and to do so without overruling Murdock. Bookstores
and theaters will somehow appear to the Court quite unlike the
religious colporteurs in Murdock.
Moving away from time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial activity and commercial statements, the focus shifts to
attempts to suppress commercial statements because the underlying
activity is deemed harmful or is in fact illegal or because the
statements are false, deceptive, disparaging, or coercive. All the
members of the Court took pains to note that Virginia State Board
did not upset the status of false and deceptive advertising regulations or, by implication, product disparagement regulations. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan will not apply to advertising, so says
the Court.
However, because at present the law distinguishes between false,
deceptive, and disparaging statements made by the sellers and those
made by third parties such as Ralph Nader or Consumers Union,
the issue is not simple. Once commercial speech is accorded first
amendment protection, and given that profit motive is generally
50. But see Baker, supra note 11.
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immaterial, the only conceivable ground for this distinction is that
the seller can check his facts more easily than can a third party.
However, so can certain politicians who make false and deceptive
political statements regarding facts within their knowledge. And
because the seller cannot always check his facts more easily, no
apparent reason exists to distinguish between the seller's statements
and those of others. The question thus becomes whether the Supreme Court will countenance the standards of false, deceptive,
or disparaging advertising being applied to the reports of scientific
researchers, consumer advocates, and the like, as it will not to the
statements made in the political arena.
The validity of restricting advertising doctors' and lawyers'
services appears now to turn on whether such advertising may be
deemed misleading per se, or perhaps on whether it foments litigation. A line of cases, beginning with NAACP v. Button5 ' and
based on the first amendment, allows groups to inform members
of their legal rights and of the names of certain lawyers who can
handle their claims. With Virginia State Board we may find some
first-amendment-compelled relaxation of the restrictions on the
professionals themselves, for advertisements placed by the professionals should be considered no more misleading than third party
publications of lawyers' and doctors' fees. However, based upon
what was said in Virginia State Board concerning professional advertising,5 2 1 predict that the Court will not protect such advertising
by the professionals themselves, but it may very well protect third53
party publications.
How has Virginia State Board affected bans on advertising transactions which are illegal? Blackmun excepted such advertising
from the Court's holding, but he did not say why. Surely if the
advertisement amounts to the crime of solicitation, under the precedents it may be punished, although, as has been suggested, the
distinction between solicitation and advocacy is conceptually unclear.5 41 But what if the advertisement is not legally solicitation, as
it clearly would not be if it were placed by a third party? An
example is an advertisement placed by a group naming stores or
51. 371 US. 415 (1963). See also United Transport Union v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mineworkers Union v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Ba',
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
52. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
53. The constitutionality of bans on lawyers advertising may be decided

this term in In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1976), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Bates v. Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976).

54. See text accompanying note 19 supra.

people dealing in contraband and advocating patronizing them (an
advertisement the sellers would doubtless not appreciate). It is
difficult to perceive how any standards but those applicable to
ordinary advocacy of illegal acts could be applied to such an advertisement.
More crucial perhaps is the question of the validity of bans on
advertising transactions which are legal but which are nonetheless
deemed undesirable. I believe that here the message of Virginia
State Board is relatively clear. The government may not suppress
an activity which it has chosen to allow (or which is protected by
the Constitution) by suppressing information about it, whether that
information comes from the provider of the activity or from a third
person. 55 However, the reason that the government must ban or
regulate the activity directly rather than suppress it indirectly
through restricting information about it is not totally clear. Perhaps the premise is that information about the activity, other
than that conveyed through a solicitation, could not be suppressed,
even if the activity was illegal. In any event, apparently no
more suppression through restrictions on advertising will be allowed, although Blackmun's citation without disapproval of the
cases upholding the broadcast ban on cigarette advertising and the
ban on racial information in real estate transactions does introduce
some degree of uncertainty. This area of advertising bans regarding legal and illegal activities goes directly to the philosophical
heart of the first amendment and raises such basic issues as why
the government may not prevent advocacy of illegal acts, and why
it may be paternalistic regarding the purchase of goods but may
not be paternalistic regarding information about those goods, as
the Court in Virginia State Board said it may not be.
Taxation specifically directed at revenue from advertisements
remains forbidden under GrosJean v. American Press Co.,5 0 which
can be deemed only to have been strengthened by Virginia State
Board.
Finally, restrictions on picketing and boycotts should be
mentioned, although most are federal concerns. After Virginia
State Board, may advocacy of a boycott be forbidden merely because a boycott might put undesirable pressure on an enterprise?
Does the answer depend on the legality of the boycott itself? Note
that in other areas only advocacy of imminent illegal action is
generally proscribable. Does a conspiracy to advocate differ
constitutionally from the advocacy itself?5 7 May boycotts consti55. But see cases cited supra at notes 16, 17.
56. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
57. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United
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tutionally be made illegal when no conspiracy (to boycott, not to
advocate) exists among the boycotters? 58 In other words, may my
individual refusal to shop at stores owned by people whose politics
I dislike or who abide by laws I resent be made illegal? 59

May

advocacy of boycotts by unions be proscribed while advocacy by
other groups is allowed? Virginia State Board has, I believe, only
added one more unsettling ingredient to this very unsettled area.60
Thankfully, the last area of difficult questions raised by Virginia
State Board, that of coercive speech by employers or union organizers, is one that may be left for those whose concern is federal
regulation. The local problems engendered by Virginia State Board
are weighty enough.
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1972). See also California Motor Transp.

Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
58. Of course, some conspiracies to boycott constitute antitrust violations or illegal strikes, even when unilateral refusal to deal is arguably

constitutionally protected. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926);
Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted RefusaZs to
Deal, 1970 DuKE L.J. 247. And picketing by unions which is simply a
signal to other unions might be viewed as merely part of a joint conspiracy to withhold labor. Alternatively it might be considered as incitement to breach a contractual obligation and thus prohibitable under first
amendment doctrines relating to incitement of imminent illegal action.
The apparent justification for forbidding associations to act in ways in
which the individual members have a right to act probably turns on a
comparison of the likely effects of concerted group activity and individual
activity. This justification is difficult to square with certain libertarian
positions.
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1970) and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1970).
Baker would, of course, have no trouble from a first amendment standpoint with unilateral refusals to deal for political or other reasons when
the ultimate motivation is the profit of a corporation or another profitoriented enterprise. See Baker, supra note 11.
60. See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S.
215 (1974); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); Inter-

national Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Building Serv.
Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery &
Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); American Fed'n of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444-49 (1970); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951); Note, Freedom of Expression in
a Commercial Context, 78 H~av. L. REV. 1191, 1207-11 (1965).

